

ROLL

57

JFWC

Excerpt

September 28, 1942

SUBMACHINE GUNS FOR SUPPLY OF O.S.S.

COLONEL DONOVAN explained that MAJOR CARL WEFER, who is representing O.S.S. with GENERAL STILLWELL, has requested 2,500 guns for use of the Chinese in special operations. Presumably the project has the approval of GENERAL STILLWELL, since MAJOR WEFER was chosen by GENERAL STILLWELL for this work and was sent to CHINA by O.S.S. with ten or twelve other men to act as instructors of the Chinese in special operations. Another 2,500 guns will be needed for similar activities in BURMA and CHINA. It will be desirable to hold the balance of the 14,200 Dutch guns in stock for various other projects now under consideration.

There was discussion of the need for Sten 9-mm guns and GENERAL WEDEMAYER indicated that it was undesirable to make any agreement with the British to request production of those guns for the U.S. There was general agreement that, due to shortage of copper, no commitments should be made which involve diversion of the supply of ammunition.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- a. Directed that a message be sent to GENERAL STILLWELL to ascertain if he approved the project being conducted by MAJOR WEFER.
- b. Agreed that O.S.S. should be authorized to acquire the 5,000 Martin guns being manufactured for the Dutch, or such other number as are now completed, on the condition that there is no implication that the part of the 14,200 guns still in process of manufacture will be acquired; and that steps be taken to acquire the ammunition needed for the approximately 5,000 guns to be bought.

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 39SEPTEMBER 22, 1942COPY NO. 1JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEESUBMACHINE GUNS FOR SUPPLY OF G.S.S.Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, a proposal of the Office of Strategic Services, has been considered by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee which recommends the approval of acquisition by the G.S.S. of 14,200 Martin 9-mm submachine guns and also the permission to purchase 250,000 rounds per month of 9-mm ammunition for each of the months of October, November and December, provided this ammunition is allocated from the supplies being manufactured in the United States for the British.

A. E. Conkling

Secretary

SECRETENCLOSURE

1. The Office of Strategic Services has pending for submission and requested approval, an extensive list of military and other supplies for use of its S. O. operations, especially for supply to guerilla and patriot forces. Included is a request for 9-mm Sten submachine guns or a similar gun using Axis ammunition and for 9-mm ammunition supply. The United Kingdom has produced several million Sten guns for home defense and "patriot" supply. Acquisition of these guns of British manufacture involves some complication. Meantime, Army Ordnance is developing a cheap and tough American 9-mm gun using the same ammunition and designed for similar uses. This gun is to be tried in October and, if successful, production should begin in December, making guns available in quantity next year but not until then.

2. Meantime, O.S.S. has need now for 9-mm guns. 2,500 guns are requested in the Chinese area. There are available, in process of manufacture, on a Dutch lend-lease order, 14,200 Marlin 9-mm guns with wooden stocks, of which 5,000 are completed and the remainder in production due in the next few months. There is also 9-mm ammunition being produced on U.S. orders by British request at a rate reaching 35 million rounds a month in November, 1945, from which the amount of ammunition temporarily needed for the project in prospect could be made available without difficulty.

3. O.S.S. desires authority to reserve the whole of the above-mentioned block of 14,200 Marlin guns, to be held in stock for projects, and to have delivered to it in November a month of the 9-mm ammunition being produced by the U. S. Ordnance for each of the months of October, November and December, pending the production and delivery of the complete plans, delayed by wait-for-trials of the new American gun. Delivery of this total block, 14,200 guns, and 105 million rounds will be most acceptable if Ordnance find it possible.

JPWC Subcommittee
Excerpts

September 25, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNS

DR. ROGERS stated that the O.S.S. will shortly submit a new catalogue of materiel for all the supplies and equipment which will be required by O.S.S. in the next quarter, and that the requirement for Sten guns and ammunition will be included. In the meantime arrangements have been concluded for obtaining 14,200 Marlin submachine guns, 9-mm caliber, with wooden stocks. The 5,200 guns reported by LT. COL. BLAKENEY as available for O.S.S. constitute the completed part of this lot of 14,200 Marlin guns.

The purchase of these guns by the O.S.S. DR. ROGERS stated, will permit the Marlin Company to complete the production of the total number. He reported also that a request for 2,5000 of these guns has recently come from the Chinese and arrangements are being made to smuggle them into CHINA.

DR. ROGERS confirmed the request of O.S.S. for 100,000 of the new U.S. submachine guns, to be calibrated for 9-mm ammunition. It was taken for granted in this request that these guns would be as good as or superior to the Sten gun.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- a. Agreed to recommend approval of the purchase by O.S.S. of 14,200 Marlin submachine guns, 9-mm caliber; and in addition to approve the O.S.S. requirement of 250,000 rounds of 9-mm ammunition per month for the months of October, November and December, on the condition that this ammunition will be furnished from the current British allotment of 9-mm ammunition being produced in the U.S.
- b. Directed the Secretary to transmit this recommendation to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee;
- c. Agreed to lay on the table the request of O.S.S. for allocation of 100,000 of the new U.S. submachine guns until the tests of the first models of this gun have been completed.

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extract

September 23, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEN GUNS

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF questioned COLONEL STUDLER on whether the U.S. is committed to furnish 9-mm ammunition for the 3 billion Sten guns to be produced by the British.

COLONEL STUDLER, in his review of the present situation, made the following points:

a. Because of lack of copper, a horizontal percentage cut was made in the production of ammunition of all calibers. The British complained concerning the cut in the delivery schedule of 9-mm ammunition and accordingly that schedule was left untouched, but a cut of equivalent amount of raw material was made in the .303 ammunition schedule.

b. An order for 175 million rounds of 9-mm ammunition for British account has been placed in Canada, for delivery at the rate of 25 million rounds per month, but this order has recently been deleted from the Army supply program.

c. This leaves a total present production of 9-mm ammunition of 35 million rounds per month, to be fully attained in November.

d. It is probable that the British are continuing to manufacture 9-mm ammunition.

e. The requirement of O.S.S. for 250,000 rounds of 9-mm ammunition per month for the months of October, November and December 1942 can be met here by reduction of British deliveries or by additional production in the two plants manufacturing that ammunition.

f. The British requirements are many times what the present agreement allocates to them, and therefore the British may object to furnishing an adequate supply of 9-mm ammunition for the 100,000 Sten guns which O.S.S. will require in the next six months.

E. Present production of .45 caliber ammunition is only about one-third of total requirements for 1942.

(1) Of the total 1942 requirements about 221 million rounds are for U.S. Army and Navy and 3 billion rounds for Defense Aid.

h. The production capacity for .45-caliber ammunition is far greater than present production but is held back by shortage of copper.

i. Present production of .45-caliber submachine guns is at the rate of 3,100,000, of which 37,000 are for U.S. Army and Navy requirements for 1942 and 971,000 are for Defense Aid.

j. The U.S. Army has a development project for an all-metal submachine gun which will culminate on October 19, 1942. This gun will cost about ten to fifteen dollars and is primarily for use in special operations. It can be produced for both .45-caliber or 9-mm caliber ammunition by substitution of three parts. The first five models will be ready in about three weeks and production can be started within two months thereafter, provided priorities can be obtained on needed materials.

COLONEL STUBLER suggested that it might be desirable to buy Sten guns from the British for subversive purposes for immediate needs and later to use the new U.S. all-metal submachine gun in place of the Sten gun.

After discussion,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Requested DR. ROGERS to obtain a report from the O.S.S. on the following questions:

- a. What will be the O.S.S. requirements for 9-mm ammunition for the 100,000 sub-machine guns which have been requested?
- b. What will be the requirements for monthly deliveries of 9-mm ammunition for these guns?
- c. Will the O.S.S. have a requirement for the new U.S. all-metal submachine guns, in 9-mm caliber, in place of the stated requirements for Sten guns; and if so, in what amounts and on what time schedule?

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extract

September 22, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNS

DR. ROGERS presented a report based on information obtained from the Munitions Assignment Board indicating that the U.S. Army Ordnance Department plans to produce over 500,000 rounds of 9-mm ammunition. It also stated that the O.S.S. had arranged to take over 14,000 Sten guns which had been manufactured for the Dutch. The O.S.S. request for the allocation of 100,000 Sten guns of British manufacture was renewed.

LT. COL. ONTHANK reported that, at the urgent request of the Munitions Assignment Board, the request of O.S.S. for 100,000 Sten guns had been transmitted to them, but not as a committee decision.

MAJOR WOOLNOUGH pointed out that the conclusive factor in the decision to recommend that 100,000 Sten guns be manufactured for O.S.S. was the shortage of raw materials for ammunition. If this will result in a lack of .45 caliber ammunition for our own forces it will be undesirable to divert any raw materials to the manufacture of 9-mm ammunition. LT. COL. BLAKENEY concurred in this view.

CAPTAIN CROSSKOPF stated that there seems to be insufficient information presently available to the Committee on which it can make a decision, especially as to the reported order of the Ordnance Department to produce 420,000 rounds of 9-mm ammunition and whether that amount is already allocated to the British or for any other purposes.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Requested MAJOR WOOLNOUGH to obtain all the facts necessary for a considered decision, bringing before the Committee any persons who could give the final information needed.

September 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Colonel Gathank
FROM: William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Sten Guns

The Service Command and Secret
Operations would like 100,000 Sten Guns made
available for its operations. Of this number,
10,000 are needed immediately, the others in
six months.

William J. Donovan
Director

EXCERPT FROM
JFWC MINUTES

August 24, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUN

COLONEL DONOVAN read the recommendation of the Subcommittee and referred also to the production of an American 9-mm. submachine gun.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER reported that British members of the Combined Staff Planners have requested from London further information as to the uses to be made of Sten guns, especially in subversive operations, and that it would be desirable for this information to be before this Committee when action is taken on this subject.

THE COMMITTEE:

Deferred action on this subject until its next meeting.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC MINUTES

August 24, 1942

PRODUCTION OF 9 MM. STEN MACHINE GUNS BY U.S.

Because of the connection of this subject with
the production of Sten submachine guns.

THE COMMITTEE:

Deferred action until its next meeting.

EXCERPTS FROM
JFWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING

August 20, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNS

The Subcommittee considered the draft of a report to be made to the Munitions Assignment Board in answer to its request of August 4, 1942 for information as to any additional requirements for the Sten submachine gun. COLONEL DONOVAN stated that in view of the operations now proposed it would be possible to reduce the O.S.S. requirement for additional Sten guns to a figure of five thousand instead of one hundred thousand, with one thousand rounds of 9-mm. ammunition apiece, within a time limit of ninety days.

With other changes in wording,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- a. Accepted the draft of the proposed reply to the Munitions Assignment Board.

Note: To be issued as J.P.W.C. 28

- b. Directed the Secretary to circulate the basic paper and the proposed reply to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for consideration at its next meeting.

- c. Directed the Secretary to draft a second paper stating in effect the background concerning the production of the M-2 gun and ammunition therefor which had been given by COLONEL STUDLER; and recommending that since the United States must operate in both the Far Eastern and the European theaters it should produce an all-metal submachine gun calibrated for both .45-cal. and 9-mm. cal. for use in these two theaters respectively.

Note: To be issued as J.P.W.C. 29

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 19, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUN

COLONEL STUDLER exhibited two models of the M-2 Submachine Gun, 45 cal., which has been developed as an alternate for the Thompson Submachine Gun (M-1). Discussion of the possibility of using this gun in place of the Sten Gun brought out the following information:

1. The U. S. program for production of sub-machine guns is for one hundred thousand M-1's (Thompson) and ten thousand M-2's per month.
2. The M-2 is superior to the Sten Gun in construction and use.
3. Although the M-2 will not break down into as small a package as the Sten Gun, it can be broken into two parts capable of being packed into containers to be dropped from planes.
4. The original contract price for the M-2 gun is thirty-seven dollars and twelve cents and the British cost for the Sten Gun, on the basis of a production of two million, is about twenty-four dollars and would be greater in the United States.
5. The O. S. S. estimates that it will need one hundred thousand submachine guns in the next ninety days.
6. The Marlin-Rockwell plant which will produce the M-2 is tooled for 9 mm. guns and has produced about fifteen thousand for the DUTCH.
7. A pilot model of the M-2 submachine gun (M-2 converted to fire 9 mm. ammunition) could be obtained in about two weeks after approval of the project and the factory could be retooled to produce M-3's instead of M-2's in about six weeks.
8. Present production, both U. S. and Canadian, of 9 mm. ammunition is twenty million rounds per month which will increase in the near future to thirty-five million rounds per month.
9. Additional capacity for production of 9 mm. ammunition can only be obtained by releasing the

-2-

present capacity for 45 calibre ammunition, in which there is presently extra capacity. There will be little difficulty in retooling for production of 9 mm. ammunition.

10. There would be little difference in cost in 9 mm. ammunition and 45 calibre ammunition.

COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that one important factor to be considered is the estimated length of the War. If it is to be a long war the quality of the submachine guns should be reasonably high, and this condition is better met by the M-2 than by the Sten Gun.

He stressed another basic factor as the desirability of not being wholly dependent on the British on production of a 9 mm. submachine gun for use in German occupied territories, which applies to production of ammunition as well.

LT. COL. BLAKENEY raised the question of whether the output of ten thousand M-2's per month has been allocated to a definite use. If not, the present production could be switched to M-3's and be regarded as a substitute requirement rather than as a supplemental requirement.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF recommended that present procedure should be.

1. To determine whether the present production of M-2's is already allocated and for what purpose and area.

2. If the allocation is for Europe the M-2's should be converted to 9 mm. calibre.

3. If the allocation is for areas where the enemy is not using 9 mm. ammunition and where the U. S. is proposing to enter, the M-2's should not be converted from 45 calibre.

COLONEL STUDLER stated that conditions seemed to be such that it would be desirable to develop a cheap all metal submachine gun of 45 calibre and also of 9 mm. calibre and store them for use in either theater.

COLONEL DONOVAN proposed to meet the immediate need of the O.S.S. by borrowing one hundred thousand Sten Guns from the British, on a replaceable basis, and go into the immediate production of M-2's converted to 9 mm. calibre.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

-3-

1. Agreed that it would be desirable to ask the British for one hundred thousand Sten Guns to meet immediate needs until such time as a better weapon can be developed and made in this country.
2. To recommend that the production of 9 mm. ammunition be increased to capacity in this country.

SECRETJ.P.W.O. 28AUGUST 20, 1942COPY NO. 17JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEPRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNSNote by the Secretary

These are attached:

1. Copy of Memorandum dated August 4, 1942 from Munitions Assignment Board to Secretary, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.
2. Copy of Memorandum dated July 15, 1942 from Lieut. General G. N. Macready to the Executive Officer, Combined Munitions Assignments Board.
3. Copy of Memorandum dated July 20, 1942 from Commanding General, S.O.S. to Executive Officer, Combined Munitions Assignments Board.
4. Discussion and recommendations of Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee, adopted at its meeting August 20, 1942.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURECOPYTHE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Munitions Assignment Board

August 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Subject: Production of Sten Submachine Guns.

1. There is enclosed herewith a copy of M.B.W. 20 which covers a memorandum from Lt. General Macready to the Executive Officer of the Munitions Assignment Board on the above subject together with the views of Lt. General Somervell on this matter.
2. At the 26th meeting of the Board this case was referred to a committee, consisting of Lt. General G. M. Macready, Major General R. C. Moore, and Colonel W. F. Tompkins, for consideration and recommendations.
3. The British requirements include a number of Sten submachine guns for subversive activities. London has been asked to advise the quantity being procured for this purpose and reply is expected within a few days.
4. Information is desired as to whether or not your committee is planning any activities which would involve requirements for this weapon which are not now included in the present combined operations plans.
5. A similar memorandum has been sent to the Secretariat, Combined Staff Planners.

S/ William F. Tompkins
WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS
Colonel, Corps of Engineers

1 Incl.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. _____

M.E.W. #20

July 22, 1942

MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD IN WASHINGTON
PRODUCTION OF "STEN" SUB-MACHINE GUN

NOTE BY SECRETARIES

The attached letters addressed to the Executive Officer,
Munitions Assignments Board, are referred for the consideration
of the Board.

E. C. KIELKOPF

T. A. H. DUNLEY

Combined Secretariat

2 Inclosures.

Lieut. Gen. Macready's letter July 15, 1942.

Lieut. Gen. Somervell's letter July 20, 1942.

~~U.S. SECRET~~
~~BRITISH MOST SECRET~~

M.E.W. #20

July 28, 1942

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington

July 15th, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Major General H. Burns.
Executive Officer C.M.A.B.

PRODUCTION OF "STEN" SUB MACHINE GUN.

Sir Walter Layton, on behalf of the British Minister of War Production, has asked if the following question could be decided in Washington by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate bodies which deal with matters of this kind.

2. In 1941, the manufacture in the U.K. of a light, cheap, and easily made sub machine gun called the "Sten" was undertaken with a view to providing weapons of this kind as rapidly as possible for all British and Allied forces, which could not quickly obtain supplies of the Thompson machine guns.

3. For the moment the issue of the Sten sub machine gun is mainly limited to static troops such as ground personnel on aerodromes, coast defence units and certain local forces and Patriot forces. The Ministry of War production estimate that the total British requirements for all purposes so far as can be foreseen will be met by the end of March 1943, when two million of these guns will have been produced. The manufacturing capacity on the 1st April 1943 will be 300,000 weapons per month, so that by the end of 1943 some three million guns additional to British requirements could be produced.

4. The question for consideration is, therefore, whether the factory producing the "Sten" should be closed down, or the output at any rate reduced to a very small maintenance figure in April 1943, or whether more "Sten" guns should be produced to meet the needs of the United Nations, or possibly to form a stock for the use of Patriot forces in countries now occupied.

It is generally agreed that the United Nations are very short of small arms and will be increasingly short. Not only are there current demands by allies or potential allies throughout the world, but there will be increasing need for a stockpile of small arms with which to rearm subjugated populations.

In this connection it is worth noting that 9 mm ammunition manufactured by the Axis Powers can be used in the "Sten" gun.

5. A point which closely affects this question is that of the low output of 9 mm ammunition as compared with the output of the weapons. No more capacity for making 9 mm ammunition can be found by the United Kingdom and according to present forecasts the total ammunition produced by 31st March 1943 will only be approximately 370 rounds per weapon, (when as stated

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

M.E.W. #20

July 22, 1942

above two million guns will have been produced.) It is, therefore, clear that if it is considered that the production of "Sten" guns should continue after April 1943 in the interests of the United Nations, it will be necessary to arrange for additional production of 9 mm ammunition.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this matter to be put before the Combined Munitions Assignment Board with the view to its consideration from both the operational and "requirements" points of view.

/s/ (G.N. MACREADY)
Lieut-General.
Commander, British Army Staff.

Copy to:- Lt.Gen. E.B. Somervell.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

M.B.W. #20

July 22, 1942

WAR DEPARTMENT

Headquarters, Services of Supply

Washington, D. C.

July 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL J. H. BURNS, EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
COMBINED MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT BOARD.

Subject: Production of "Sten" Sub-machine Gun.

1. With reference to General MacReady's memorandum of July 16, 1942, requesting that the Combined Munitions Assignment Board consider the desirability of further production of the "Sten" gun, it would appear that this question must be resolved by our ability to provide ammunition.

2. Our standard sub-machine gun is the Thompson gun, and studies are now underway looking to the further simplification of this gun. Our Ground Forces consider it to be a superior weapon to the "Sten" gun, and are unwilling to accept the latter as a substitute weapon. I also understand that the Russians are not willing to accept the "Sten" gun as a substitute weapon, thus reducing their requirements for the Thompson gun. Moreover, while the British are willing to accept the "Sten" gun in lieu of the Thompson gun for certain line-of-communication troops, they have already indicated their desire to obtain Thompson guns for artillery troops so that the proposed substitution will not reduce either Thompson gun or ammunition requirements. Hence, a further production of the "Sten" gun would not reduce our own production requirements in this country, nor lessen the requirements for ammunition to meet our needs.

3. There is an acute shortage in all types of small arms ammunition, a shortage which it will be difficult to alleviate, as it results from an insufficient supply of copper. Hence, it is impossible for us to undertake either the responsibility for providing ammunition for additional "Sten" guns or to furnish the requisite copper to the United Kingdom.

4. I appreciate the very useful purpose which this gun would serve. Nevertheless, I feel that its production rate should be determined by the capacity of the United Kingdom to provide ammunition without a further drain on our copper supply.

/s/ LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
Lieutenant Colonel,
Commanding.

SECRETDISCUSSION

1. The Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee, in its consideration of the request of the Munitions Assignment Board, has estimated the immediate needs for arming Patriot groups in occupied countries. The Office of Strategic Services has requested 5,000 Sten guns, with 1,000 rounds of 9 mm. ammunition apiece, within a time limit of ninety days. Further requirements are as yet undetermined.

2. On the basis of the possibility of a long war, the principle of production of weapons within control of the United States should be accepted. Complete dependence upon the British for production of a gun of this type and ammunition for it is an untenable position.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. The Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee recommends, therefore, that the Munitions Assignment Board be answered to the following purport:

(a) An additional requirement of 5,000 Sten sub-machine guns, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun, for use of the Office of Strategic Services within the next 90 days, should be included in planning the production of this gun.

(b) Accepting the principle that the production of weapons for use by U. S. forces should be under and within U. S. control, the above requirement is placed on the basis of approval of the immediate development and production in the United States of an all-metal, 9-mm. submachine gun and the corresponding increase of 9-mm. ammunition to requisite capacity.

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 29

AUGUST 20, 1942

COPY NO. 17

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

PRODUCTION OF 9-MM. SUBMACHINE GUN BY U. S.

Note by the Secretary

The following proposal is recommended by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee for submittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE

1. During consideration of a reply to the Munitions Assignment Board concerning further requirements for production of the Sten 9-mm. submachine gun, a representative of the Ordnance Department informed the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee of its plans to produce a .45-cal. all-metal submachine gun (M-2). It will be produced at the rate of 10,000 per month in one factory at an initial contract price of \$37.12 apiece. It is understood that there is now no special allocation for the M-2 gun and that it will be stored and issued as use requires.

2. It is further understood that there is now an excess capacity for production of .45-cal. ammunition.

3. The Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee, in its consideration of the uses of submachine guns for arming Patriot groups in Axis-occupied countries, as well as for other uses (e.g. Home Guards), regards the adoption of the following principle as essential:-

(a) That the production of weapons for use by U. S. forces should be under and within U. S. control.

4. The Subcommittee also believes that since U. S. operations in conjunction with Patriot groups will be carried out in Europe and the Far East it will be necessary to have submachine guns of both 9-mm. and .45 cal. for use in these areas respectively

5. The Subcommittee, therefore, recommends:-

(a) That the U. S. should immediately go into production of the M-2 all-metal submachine gun calibrated for both 9-mm. and .45 ammunition;

(b) That the excess capacity for production of .45-cal. ammunition be devoted to production of a requisite supply of 9-mm. ammunition.

August 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan
From: Colonel Goodfellow

Yesterday I went to the Ordnance Department and talked with Colonel Studler. They think very well of the Sten Gun. He said if we needed 100,000 in 90 days he could show us how we could get 100,000 in that period of time.

They showed me all the new guns they had, including a new gun which simulated the technique on the Sten gun - made of all metal. There are two hitches to it so far as S. O. and guerilla activities are concerned - you can't break the gun down and package it into the containers which fit the bomb racks in the plane.

They should 45 ammunition and we can't get that there. The Sten guns will shoot ammunition which they can steal from the enemy if they run out.

I saw a new carbine which weighs less than 6 pounds. Sten guns weigh about 7 pounds. The carbine is the kind of thing every boy would love - it's light; shoots 30 calibre. It is too long to package - one piece with a wood stock.

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Colonel Studler said they were getting in production on the carbine, and I am going to put in for 2,500 right away, since there will be a fight on priority.

The carbine should be the fixed weapon of guerilla units; the Sten should be used behind the lines.

I talked with two of the fellows who had given us bids on the gun, - we have three bids so far, and they are all substantially the same.

I would recommend that we make, just for insurance purposes and for our own supplies, 100,000 of these Sten guns. Colonel Studler can get me 100,000 in 90 days. They farm out the small parts to smaller companies, and then they assemble them.

The War Production Board sent a fellow over and asked if any of the gadgets we manufacture could be farmed out to smaller firms - if so, they would appreciate it.

As to the British, who will have this complement of 2,000,000 guns with 370 rounds of ammunition as of April 1, and will have a capacity for 300,000 for the next year. This should be continued to be built up, but for our purposes we

-3-

would need 100,000 right away. Therefore, since we can't get them from the British, as insurance for ourselves we should make 100,000 - then take another look at the situation. We should also get priority for a certain amount of ammunition.

21st June 1956
x Common. Co.
1 production.

August 17, 1942

From: Captain Doering
To: Colonel Donovan
Subject: Ammunition for S Guns

SECRET

The figures given in this memorandum have been obtained from the attached telegram addressed to you, and from conversations with Messrs. D. F. Carpenter of Remington Arms Company and H. E. Clive of the British Purchasing Commission.

1. Problem Presented

The British now have quantity production of the S gun in a factory located in the United Kingdom and in a Canadian plant about to go into production. By the end of March, 1943, 2,000,000 guns will have been produced. This will be sufficient to satisfy British requirements. I am not advised of the use which the British intend making of these guns, but I understand they are well adapted to Commando and S.O. operations. Because of their low cost of production, ~~\$1.00~~² per gun, they may also be distributed to Britain's Home Guard.

On April 1, 1943, the manufacturing capacity of the S gun will be 300,000 per month; so that by the end of 1944, approx. only 2,700,000 additional guns can be produced. The

Colonel Donovan

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August 17, 1942

question presented in the attached telegram is the extent, if any, to which the production of these guns should be continued after April 1, 1943, "to meet the needs of the United Nations or to form a stock pile for the use of patriot forces in countries now occupied." However, Mr. Clive informs me that the British estimate their needs at 1,000 rounds per gun, and from the figures given, which appear to be correct, they will have only 370 rounds per gun in March, 1943, when 2,000,000 guns will have been completed. It seems therefore that the question of supplying the British with the balance of 630 rounds per gun is also involved.

Guns are urgently needed, and we are advised that it would be impracticable to change over production to a different caliber or type of gun. Apart from the problem of shortages of materials, it is therefore obviously desirable to continue maximum production to the extent that 9mm. ammunition can be produced for this purpose in Britain, the United States and Canada, without interfering with the production of ammunition for guns which the U. S. Army believes to be of equal or greater importance.

There is not sufficient excess ammunition capacity in this country, Canada and the United Kingdom to provide the required ammunition (1,000 rounds per gun) for 5,000,000 S guns,

Colonel Donovan

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AUGUST 17, 1942

at the speed with which the guns themselves are produced. It would be possible within a few months to change over capacity for production of .45 automatic pistol and/or .30 carbine ammunition to 9mm. parabellum ammunition. However, excess capacity in these calibers is not sufficient to supply the entire estimated output of these guns. To accomplish this, it would be necessary to increase capacity until the required total production had been reached.

2. Production of Arms

In the United States, production of the Thompson submachine gun is estimated at ^{approximately 2,000 per month} 30,000 per month, and preparations are being made for the production of the .30 carbine in the plants of 12 to 15 different companies at the rate of 11,500 per day.

3. Production of Ammunition

The only calibers in which production facilities can be converted for the production of 9mm. are the .45 caliber for the Thompson submachine gun and the .30 caliber for the .30 carbine. Present capacity for production in the United States of 9mm. amounts to 15,000,000 per month at Winchester. By October Winchester will have converted an additional capacity

Colonel Donovan

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August 17, 1942

of 7,000,000 per month, now devoted to production of .45s, into 9mm. production, a total of 22,000,000 per month. Western Cartridge Company will also by October change over a capacity for 13,000,000 .45s into production of 13,000,000 9mm. per month. By October therefore Western and Winchester will be producing 35,000,000 9mm. cartridges per month. To this must be added the output of a new factory in Canada which will go into production of 9mm. beginning next month. This factory is scheduled to produce 500,000 rounds in September, 1942, and thereafter at an increasing rate until the maximum capacity of 100,000,000 rounds per month is reached in October, 1943.

All of the above production, including that of Winchester and Western, is to be for British account, and is apparently included in the figures given in the attached telegram of 370 rounds per gun for 2,000,000 guns by March 31, 1943.

Therefore on the basis of 1,000 rounds per weapon, which is Mr. Clive's statement of British total requirements, an additional 630 rounds per weapon will be required, or a total of 1,260,000,000 rounds by March 31, 1943. In addition, if production of the gun is to be continued after March 31, 1943, at capacity, it is estimated that an additional 2,700,000

Colonel Donovan

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guns will be produced by the end of the year, which at the rate of 1,000 rounds per gun will require an additional 2,700,000,000 rounds, or a grand total of 3,960,000,000 rounds.

As you know, small arms ammunition factories are not being operated at capacity today because of a shortage of copper. Disregarding the question of shortage of materials, there will be an estimated excess of .45 caliber capacity by March, 1943, according to Mr. Clive, of approximately 45,000,000 rounds per month. Moreover, we are informed that capacity for the .30 carbine ammunition is being built up to 5,000,000 rounds per day, which is said by Mr. Carpenter to be at least twice the United States' requirements for 1943, as presently stated. If all of this excess capacity were converted into production of 9mm., which could be done within 3 to 5 months, it would result in increased total production by March 31, 1943, of approximately 360,000,000 rounds, or at the rate of approximately 120,000,000 rounds per month. However, since 2,000,000 guns will have been produced by next March 31st, such added production to that date would only add 180 rounds per gun. This added to the 370 rounds presently stated by the British would only amount to 550 instead of the desired 1,000 rounds per weapon.

4. Conclusions

(A). There is not sufficient excess capacity in this

Colonel Donovan

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country of .45 and .30 caliber for conversion into 9mm. to attain the desired production, even when added to Canadian and British production. A substantial increase would be necessary.

(B). The Sten gun has no exact counterpart in this country and is extremely useful for certain types of operations, such as Commando and S.O. operations. It may also be very useful to equip Home Guards since it is very light, and the production cost is only approximately \$~~2.00~~[?]. It also may well be the most suitable weapon with which to equip patriot forces in enemy-occupied territories, since it is very light, short, may be broken down into only three parts, and uses a 9mm. cartridge which may be obtained through stores hidden away or stores captured from enemy troops.

(C). Since 80% of the Sten guns are manufactured in the United Kingdom (the remaining 20% in Canada), any stock pile would undoubtedly be located in England, and the ammunition would have to be shipped there.

(D). The question of whether or not the contemplated expansion in 9mm. production in this country should be greatly increased depends of course largely upon the value of the weapon. Presently existing excess capacity of ammunition

Colonel Donovan

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August 17, 1942

production in this country could furnish ammunition for a very considerable percentage of the estimated 5,000,000 of these guns. Of course that capacity could be increased, but this would involve the utilization of considerable material in construction, etc. and would take considerably longer than the period estimated to convert the existing excess capacity.


O. H. R., Jr.

TK

WAS US GOVT

OBS WASHINGTON DO AUG 8 250P

MOST SECRET

COL DONOVAN

ST REGIS HOTEL NEWYORK NY (TO BE DELIVERED IMMEDIATELY)

BY THE END OF MARCH, 1943 TWO MILLION B GUNS WILL HAVE BEEN PRODUCED. THE MANUFACTURING CAPACITY ON APRIL 1 WILL BE THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PER MONTH SO THAT BY THE END OF 1943 SOME THREE MILLION ADDITIONAL TO BRITISH REQUIREMENTS CAN BE PRODUCED. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE FACTORY PRODUCING THE B GUN SHOULD BE CLOSED OR THE OUTPUT REDUCED TO A SMALL MAINTENANCE FIGURE IN APRIL, 1943 OR WHETHER MORE B GUNS SHOULD BE PRODUCED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR TO FORM A STOCK PILE FOR THE USE OF PATRIOT FORCES IN COUNTRIES NOW OCCUPIED. IT IS NOTED THAT 9 MM AMMUNITION MANUFACTURED BY THE AXIS POWERS CAN BE USED IN THE B GUN. A POINT WHICH AFFECTS THIS QUESTION IS THE LOW OUTPUT OF 9 MM AMMUNITION AS COMPARED WITH THE OUTPUT OF THE WEAPON. NO ADDITIONAL CAPACITY EXISTS FOR MAKING SUCH AMMUNITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. AND PRESENT ESTIMATE IS THAT THE TOTAL PRODUCTION BY MARCH 31 WILL BE ONLY 370 ROUNDS PER WEAPON. THEREFORE, IF PRODUCTION OF SUCH GUNS CONTINUES AFTER APRIL IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ARRANGE FOR ADDITIONAL PRODUCTION OF 9 MM AMMUNITION. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE THE B GUN FOR THE T GUN. THEREFORE A FURTHER PRODUCTION OF THE B GUN WOULD NOT REDUCE OUR OWN PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS NOR LESSEN REQUIREMENTS FOR GENERAL AMMUNITION NEEDS.

EXCERPT FROM
JFWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 11, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEEL SEMI-AUTOMATIC GUNS

COLONEL DONOVAN called attention to the memorandum from CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF suggesting additional production. He added that he had requested information regarding ammunition supply from the Remington Arms Company and had also asked the S.O.E. if any improvements are to be made in the gun.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF pointed out the speed in production and the exact savings in copper due to the gun's 9 mm. calibre should be investigated.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Took note:

1. COLONEL DONOVAN will have included in the Remington report necessary information on the speed in production of guns and the amount of savings in copper in the ammunition.
2. LT. COL. BLAKENEY will cooperate with the Subcommittee of the Joint Staff Planners to get information from London and the Munitions Assignment Board as to numbers needed for subversive activities.

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

August 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable W.J. Donovan,
Chairman of Sub-Committee,
Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

1. Pursuant to our discussion at the meeting of the Sub-Committee of the J.P.W.C., held 7 August in regard to the production of Sten sub-machine guns:

It is my belief that the manufacture of the Sten gun should be continued beyond March 1943 (perhaps at a reduced rate) until such time as there is a surplus of at least 1,500,000 guns available beyond the 2,000,000 estimated to be the British requirements.

2. The manufacture of ammunition should be continued at at least the present rate until such time as approximately 1,000 rounds per gun is available. The issue of the guns could be dependent upon the availability of the ammunition.

3. It is difficult to foresee the U.S. requirements for this gun ~~at~~ the present time. These requirements would appear to depend upon the following:

(1) The advisability of substituting this gun for the Thompson sub-machine gun for the use of local defense forces, home guards, etc., (guards for water dams, high power lines, bridges, vital manufacturing plants, etc.). This would release for use by the active armed forces many Thompson sub-machine guns. In this connection the difference in cost and the great saving entailed in the use of the Sten gun is an item to be considered.

(2) The amount of arms that the O.S.S. considers will be required by guerrilla organizations, to supply native populations (Philippines and M.E.I.), and similar activities of which we spoke this morning. It would seem that the Sten gun, due to its simplicity and cheapness, will be an ideal weapon for their use in this type of work.

4. It would appear that the serviceability and ease of manufacture of this gun should ~~be given~~ our careful consideration



- 1 -

SECRET

Memorandum for the Hon. W.J. Donovan, 8-7-42.

For certain special purposes even to the point of our taking up the manufacture of ammunition to augment the limited facilities of the British. In this connection it should be noted that ammunition for the Sten gun uses somewhat less critical material (copper) than the .45 caliber ammunition of the Thompson gun. The considerable saving represented by approximately \$70.00 difference in cost of the two guns is a further item for consideration.

Respectfully yours,

H. L. Greenkopf
H. L. Greenkopf
Captain, U.S.N.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 7, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEEL SUBMACHINE GUNS

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF suggested the use of this gun for U. S. local defense forces, and recommended that production of the gun continue for several months until a reserve of 1,500,000 guns and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun is accumulated. He suggested that the use of this gun to supply native populace of the PHILIPPINES and N.E.I. be also considered by the O.S.S.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

Took note that CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF would submit his proposals in writing for consideration next Tuesday.

**EXCERPT FROM
JFPC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES**

August 5, 1942

PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNS

A letter was read from the Munitions Assignment Board requesting information on whether the J.P.W.C. is planning any activities which would involve requirements for Sten Submachine Guns and ammunition therefor, as a result of questions raised on this subject by GENERAL MACREADY, Commander of the British Army Staff in the U. S.

COLONEL DONOVAN analyzed the problem as requiring a decision on whether the Sten gun is so valuable to our operations that we request reallocation of our whole ammunition supply or whether some other decision can not be reached.

MR. TAYLOR pointed out that even if additional ammunition can not be obtained for the Sten gun there will still be need for additional production for Patriots in the occupied countries who will be able to obtain 9 mm. ammunition for the gun from Axis stocks. Further discussion indicated the general thought that it would be desirable for the British to produce an additional number of Sten guns beyond the two million that will be ready by April 1943 in order to build up a stock-pile for distribution to occupied country Patriot groups.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed to consider this problem further and to bring any suggestions for its solution to the next meeting on Friday.

SECRET**AUGUST 3, 1942**

**SUBCOMMITTEE OF
JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE**

MEMORANDUM**PRODUCTION OF STEN SUBMACHINE GUNS**

The following letter from the Assistant Executive, Munitions Assignment Board, is transmitted for consideration and report to the J.P.W.C.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

COPY

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Munitions Assignments Board

August 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Subject: Production of Sten Submachine Guns.

1. There is enclosed herewith a copy of M.B.W. 20 which covers a memorandum from Lt. General Macready to the Executive Officer of the Munitions Assignments Board on the above subject together with the views of Lt. General Somervell on this matter.
2. At the 26th meeting of the Board this case was referred to a committee, consisting of Lt. General G. M. Macready, Major General R. G. Moore, and Colonel W. F. Tompkins, for consideration and recommendations.
3. The British requirements include a number of Sten sub-machine guns for subversive activities. London has been asked to advise the quantity being procured for this purpose and reply is expected within a few days.
4. Information is desired as to whether or not your committee is planning any activities which would involve requirements for this weapon which are not now included in the present combined operations plans.
5. A similar memorandum has been sent to the Secretariat, Combined Staff Planners.

S/ William F. Tompkins
WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS
Colonel, Corps of Engineers

1 Incl.

SECRET

~~U.S. SECRET~~
~~INITIAL MOST SECRET~~

M.B.W. #80

July 22, 1942

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION

OFFICES OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington

July 15th, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Major General H. Burns,
Executive Officer C.M.A.B.

PRODUCTION OF "STEN" SUB MACHINE GUN.

Sir Walter Layton, on behalf of the British Minister of War Production, has asked if the following question could be decided in Washington by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate bodies which deal with matters of this kind.

2. In 1941, the manufacture in the U.K. of a light, cheap, and easily made sub machine gun called the "Sten" was undertaken with a view to providing weapons of this kind as rapidly as possible for all British and Allied forces, which could not quickly obtain supplies of the Thompson machine guns.

3. For the moment the issue of the Sten sub machine gun is mainly limited to static troops such as ground personnel on aerodromes, coast defence units and certain local forces and Patriot forces. The Ministry of War production estimate that the total British requirements for all purposes so far as can be foreseen will be met by the end of March 1943, when two million of these guns will have been produced. The manufacturing capacity on the 1st April 1943 will be 300,000 weapons per month, so that by the end of 1943 some three million guns additional to British requirements could be produced.

4. The question for consideration is, therefore, whether the factory producing the "Sten" should be closed down, or the output at any rate reduced to a very small maintenance figure in April 1943, or whether more "Sten" guns should be produced to meet the needs of the United Nations, or possibly to form a stock for the use of Patriot forces in countries now occupied.

It is generally agreed that the United Nations are very short of small arms and will be increasingly short. Not only are there current demands by allies or potential allies throughout the world, but there will be increasing need for a stockpile of small arms with which to disarm subjugated populations.

In this connection it is worth noting that 9 mm ammunition manufactured by the Axis powers can be used in the "Sten" gun.

5. A point which closely affects this question is that of the low output of 9 mm ammunition as compared with the output of the weapons. The mere capacity for making 9 mm ammunition can be found by the United Kingdom and according to present forecasts the total ammunition produced by 31st March 1943 will only be approximately 370 rounds per weapon, (when at scaled

U.S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

M.B.W. #20

July 22, 1942

above two million guns will have been produced.) It is, therefore, clear that if it is considered that the production of "Sten" guns should continue after April 1943 in the interests of the United Nations, it will be necessary to arrange for additional production of 9 mm ammunition.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this matter to be put before the Combined Munitions Assignment Board with the view to its consideration from both the operational and "requirements" points of view.

/s/ (G.N.MACREADY)
Lieut-General.
Commander, British Army Staff.

Copy to:- Lt.Gen. B.B.Somervell.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

M.B.W. #80

July 22, 1942

WAR DEPARTMENT

Headquarters, Services of Supply

Washington, D. C.

July 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL J. H. BURNS, EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
COMBINED MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT BOARD.

Subject: Production of "Sten" Sub-machine Gun.

1. With reference to General MacReady's memorandum of July 16, 1942, requesting that the Combined Munitions Assignment Board consider the desirability of further production of the "Sten" gun, it would appear that this question must be resolved by our ability to provide ammunition.

2. Our standard sub-machine gun is the Thompson gun, and studies are now underway looking to the further simplification of this gun. Our Ground Forces consider it to be a superior weapon to the "Sten" gun, and are unwilling to accept the latter as a substitute weapon. I also understand that the Lusitans are not willing to accept the "Sten" gun as a substitute weapon, thus reducing their requirements for the Thompson gun. Moreover, while the British are willing to accept the "Sten" gun in lieu of the Thompson gun for certain line-of-communication troops, they have already indicated their desire to obtain Thompson guns for artillery troops so that the proposed substitution will not reduce either Thompson gun or ammunition requirements. Hence, a further production of the "Sten" gun would not reduce our own production requirements in this country, nor lessen the requirements for ammunition to meet our needs.

3. There is an acute shortage in all types of small arms ammunition, a shortage which it will be difficult to alleviate, as it results from an insufficient supply of copper. Hence, it is impossible for us to undertake either the responsibility for providing ammunition for additional "Sten" guns or to furnish the requisite copper to the United Kingdom.

4. I appreciate the very useful purpose which this gun would serve. Nevertheless, I feel that its production rate should be determined by the capacity of the United Kingdom to provide ammunition without a further drain on our copper supply.

/s/ BRETON CORNWELL,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Ellery C. Huntington, Lt. Col. AUS.

DATE: 8-21-42

TO : Colonel Wm. J. Donovan

SUB : London Office- British Requests for
Special Missions.

ATTENTION: Mr. James R. Murphy.

Major Hoppner asked me to have the enclosed photostats made and delivered to you.

The letter and memorandum of August 11th deals with a request for a quota of officers to be attached to the British Training Schools.

The letter and request of July 21st is a matter which probably concerns Colonel Goodfellow more than myself, except that if training is to be undertaken at once, it may have to be commenced at existing areas.

Colonel Goodfellow has, I believe, a copy of this memorandum from Major Hoppner.

EC
Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS.

Attachments- 9

SECRET

MEMORANDUM
FROM: Hilary G. Huntington, Lt. Col. AUS, **DATE:** 6-22-54
TO : Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
SUB : London Office - British Requests for
 Special Missions

ATTENTION: Mr. James R. Haggard

Major Haggard asked me to have the enclosed photostats made and delivered to you.

The letter and memorandum of August 11th deals with a request for a quota of officers to be attached to the British Training Schools.

The letter and request of July 21st is a matter which probably concerns Colonel Goodfellow more than myself, except that if training is to be undertaken at once, it may have to be commenced at existing areas.

Colonel Goodfellow has, I believe, a copy of this memorandum from Major Haggard.

Hilary G. Huntington, Jr
 Lt. Colonel, AUS.

Attachments- 9

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Wilery O. Huntington, Lt. Col. AUS. DATE: 8-21-48
TO : Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
SUB : London Office- British Requests for
Special Missions.

ATTENTION: Mr. James R. Murphy

Major Heppner asked me to have the enclosed photostats made and delivered to you.

The letter and memorandum of August 11th deals with a request for a quota of officers to be attached to the British Training Schools.

The letter and request of July 21st is a matter which probably concerns Colonel Goodfellow more than myself, except that if training is to be undertaken at once, it may have to be commenced at existing areas.

Colonel Goodfellow has, I believe, a copy of this memorandum from Major Heppner.

Wilery O. Huntington, Jr
Lt. Colonel, AUS.

Attachments- 9

INTER-SERVICES RESEARCH BUREAU

34, BAKER STREET,

TELEPHONE
WELBEC, 7744

LONDON, W. 1

11th August, 1942.

Major Hoppner,
American Embassy,
Grosvenor Square, W.1.

Dear *Hoppner*.

When I informed the Brigadier that you were proposing to take with you a copy of his notes to Colonel Guenther, he suggested that it would be better if they were revised. He thought we should amplify para 3(a) on the subject of attachments to our Air Squadrons, and should also give descriptive titles to the various establishments in preference to describing them by their numbers. In para 3(b)(i) he would like the last sentence omitted as he hopes that these officers will stay in this country and not necessarily return to Washington after a short period.

I am therefore enclosing a revised version with which I hope Colonel Guenther will agree.

We are cabling to our representatives in the United States telling them about the proposals and saying that you will

P.T.O.

be taking details to Colonel Goodfellow.

Yours
R. G.

W. H. S. Hap

P.S. apologies for bad blotter.

MOST SECRET

11th August 1941

MOST SECRET

Copy No: 1/4

ATTACHMENT OF AMERICAN O.S.B. OFFICERSTO STAFFS AT S.O.E. H.Q. ANDCERTAIN ESTABLISHMENTS1. OBJECT

To take certain immediate steps to ensure the effective co-operation of O.S.B. and S.O.E. activities in Western Europe on the arrival of the full American Staffs at a later date.

2. INTENTION

To arrange for American officers to be attached in executive posts (after training) as members of the Staff at certain Stations and Schools.

METHOD(a) Air Operations

A suggestion has been put up to the Air Ministry to the effect that a detachment of American Parachute Dropping aircraft, complete with crews and an American Intelligence Officer should be attached to the Squadron which carries out such operations on behalf of S.O.E. Similarly it has been suggested that it would be desirable if American personnel should have the opportunity of learning the procedure evolved in this country for the dropping and picking up of agents by Lysander and equivalent types of aircraft.

(b) Training Establishments

(i) Finishing School. Two captains or subalterns - keen with wide experience if possible including intelligence, security, or police work.

(ii) Parachute Training School. Two captains or subalterns - young, fit and keen to work as parachute instructors; experience of jumping an asset.

(iii) Industrial Sabotage School. One captain - practical engineering experience and knowledge of modern industrial practice.

(c) Signals Establishments

(i) Wireless Training School. Two subalterns with signals experience, and members of the American Radio Relay League.

(ii) Operational Wireless Station. Three subalterns with technical qualifications as for the Wireless Training School. These officers to serve as duty officers.

/s/ (d)

(d) Operations Section H.Q.

(1) Dispatch and Packing Station. One officer of American Army Air Corps with parachute experience equivalent rank of captain.

(11) Operations Room. One officer of G.S.C. III seniority to learn the work.

(11) Stores Section. One captain or subaltern with knowledge of small arms and explosives, and, if possible, parachute equipment.

(e) Naval Small Boat Section.

One officer under 30, experience of small yachts and boats. Must be very fit and very security minded.

4. TOTAL OFFICERS REQUIRED

(a)	Training Establishments	5
(b)	Signals Establishments	8
(c)	Operations	3
(d)	Naval Small Boat Section	1

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MOST SECRET

MOST SECRET
LCMR/252

21st July, 1948

Dear Colonel

Attached is a copy of a memorandum which I wrote after our meeting yesterday.

I am also forwarding a copy of some notes on training which I have received from Colonel Munn.

To save confusion and explanations, we suggest that we always refer to these teams by their code name, JEDBURGHs.

I thought you might like to have the above for reference.

Yours faithfully
John Rank

Colonel C. E. C. Munn
Office of Strategic Services.